This article tests the linkage between institutional configuration and social trust, highlighting the role of the welfare states in coordinating interests among different labor market actors. This study initially builds a theoretical framework distinguishing training-supplemented welfare regimes from transfer-based welfare regimes. Evidence from descriptive and multivariate analyses of World Values Surveys based on 17 advanced industrial democracies supports my argument that public investment in skill provision prevalent in trainingsupplemented welfare states leads to higher accumulation of social trust, while passive social transfers result in lower social trust. Especially, high investment in public skill provision leads to a decreased gap in social trust between employers and low-skilled workers, as well as among different occupational groups. In addition, the negative effect of passive social transfers on trust is greatly ameliorated when it is jointly configured with high ALMP. The findings lend credibility to my claim that specific social policies aiming to upgrade citizens" skill levels provide employees with better prospects of managing life chances (and risks) and therefore build higher social trust. Finally, the institutional approach has contended that trust is promoted by the quality of institutional performances or institutional arrangements featured by law, government policies, and certified professional associations (Rothstein 1998; 2002) . This approach argues that, when public institutions are effectively functioning as a "fair rule-setter or rule-imposer" (Cook et al. 2005), individuals will be assured that other actors are not likely to be engaged in opportunistic behaviors. This assurance will eventually lead to the creation of the societal norm that general others are trustworthy. In particular, the cross-national study of Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) makes the important point that universal social policy design plays a decisive role in generating this general norm of trust, although it does not employ any measures for social policies, simply using income equality as a proxy.
There has been a plethora of research on the sources and effects of trust on economic, political, and social outcomes at the societal level. The literature on governance and trust, igniting substantial scholarly interest in the importance of trust across diverse social science disciplines, has well documented the significant role of social trust in building a more effective government (Putnam 1993) , a more democratic regime (Inglehart 1997; Paxton 2002) , a less corrupted regime (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) and higher economic growth (Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; LaPorta et al. 1997 ). At the micro-level, trust has been known to serve not only as the basic source of social order (Coleman 1988) , but also as the source of efficiency in market transaction (Arrow 1974; Granovetter 1985) . In short, a higher level of trust among individuals leads to more efficient economic outcomes as well as to better-functioning institutions.
Students of trust have increasingly paid more attention to the sources of trust, discovering a diverse range of determinants. The associational social capital approach, despite its unclear causal direction, has argued that civic engagement itself creates trust among participants (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Putnam 1993 Putnam , 2000 Kwak et al. 2004) , and that civic engagement in connected associations is more beneficial to building trust than affiliation with isolated associations (Paxton 2007) . The cultural approach has also emphasized several crucial determinants of trust: the role of parenting in creating optimistic views of life in early childhood at the individual level, and the role of Protestant heritages and ethnic homogeneity at the societal level (Delhey and Newton 2005; Inglehart 1997 Inglehart , 1999 Putnam 1993; Uslaner 2002) . In these traditions, declining social trust may be primarily attributable to the dwindling roles of traditional families, shrinking church approach has rarely attempted to explore the ways in which state institutions affect, transform, and create the fundamental settings of "risk" (Coleman 1990; Tilly 2005) 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS
Scholars of social dilemmas typically expect that a rational actor will be tempted not to contribute her resources in public goods, while still receiving some benefits from the structure.
Social transfer programs in modern welfare states as a type of public goods are inherently vulnerable to this free-riding problem (Olson 1965) , because an actor"s reward from social welfare system is not necessarily contingent upon her contribution to the system. For instance, it is theoretically possible in a transfer-based social welfare system for an actor to decide not to 2 Active labor market policies are the government-run labor market programs that help unemployed workers regain access to employment. They include job information and placement services, subsidy to employers, and job training. These policies aim to lower structural unemployment by enhancing not only the efficiency of the matching process, but also jobseekers" skill-levels (OECD 1993; Carcillo and Grubb 2006) work, but instead to benefit from social assistance programs, as long as other actors hold strong "insurance motives"(Moene and Wallerstein 2001) to manage future risks.
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Social welfare agencies typically employ rigorous income and means-tested programs to prevent potential abuses of social welfare programs by free-riders, but as long as free-riders determine to maintain their incomes below poverty threshold, it is still possible for them to exploit the welfare system. Although the vast majority of welfare recipients do not intentionally stay under the threshold, the feature of modern transfer-based welfare systems may lead upper and middle class contributors to perceive the recipients as free-riders.
In transfer-centered welfare states, social policies are likely to divide citizens into two categories: "bad welfare-dependents" and "good independent citizens." Unskilled redundant workers are typically re-employed in "bad jobs" at low wages with weak worker protection (Baumol 1967; Esping Andersen 1999) rather than being given opportunities for training. In most liberal and some conservative European countries, social policies are typically designed to target this population at the bottom of the social strata, which suffers from repeated cycles of unemployment and reemployment at low wage jobs. Middle and upper classes composed of skilled workers are likely to treat social welfare programs merely as philanthropic contributions to the poor, rather than as a common pool of social safety nets that may benefit themselves in bad times. In these countries, skill training is more likely to occur within firms between employers and skilled workers, as strongly unionized skilled workers have traditionally chosen employers as their skill training partners in exchange for strong employment protection and earning-related social insurance (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001) , excluding unskilled workers from the firm or industry-level skill investment and employment protection. Welfare recipients in these countries suffer from social stigmatization and psychological abuse by welfare institutions (Soss 1999; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005) and media (Gilens 1999) that treat recipients as free-riders. In this policy design, higher spending on social policies, especially social transfers primarily consisting of social service and assistance programs accompanied by means or income tests, is more likely to lead to lower trust among contributors and beneficiaries. In Nordic social democratic countries and some continental social corporatist countries such as Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, generous social transfers are combined with statefunded public job training programs. The active labor market policies (ALMP), in combination with conventional passive social transfers, effectively resolve both free-riding problems and distrust from contributors not only by imposing "contingency criteria," 5 but also by providing contributors with the strong "incentives" to participate and remain in the system. 4 This first hypothesis differs from the conventional belief that social spending and social trust are positively associated with each other (with reciprocal causal directions). In reality, the positive linkage between the size of welfare state and social trust is only observable in Nordic social democratic countries. Continental social insurance countries have fairly high levels of passive social transfers corresponding to those of their Nordic counterparts, if not actually higher than them, but they have maintained the lowest social trust for decades. In addition, liberal residual countries have increased their passive social transfers for the last two decades, but they have witnessed that the levels of their social trust are declining, almost converging with those of continental social insurance countries (see Figure 1 and Table 2 ).
The structure of ALMP pulls different groups of labor market actors together around skill formation and upgrading, thereby providing workers with future employment opportunities and employers with better qualified workers. While traditional insurance or assistance-based social transfers merely protect workers from the risk of job and income losses by supplementing income, ALMP plays a role of "skill and employment insurance." Especially, in this system, unskilled workers (also skilled workers to a lesser degree) and (some) employers have strong interest in making unemployed (potential free-riders) eventually get jobs with meaningful training opportunities coupled to income supplements, because the effectiveness and generosity of the current program directly determines their expected return (future jobs and income during training for unskilled workers, and supply of future skilled workers for some employers) from their current investment. Unemployed will also have a strong incentive to be re-employed, because new training opportunities give them better jobs than those they could get without training; better payments; and better retirement packages (which are earning and employmentrelated).
In particular, unskilled workers, who are more vulnerable to future unemployment and income loss than skilled workers, have strong incentives to monitor commitment and make sure that the unemployed obtain the valuable skills that are necessary for re-employment by employers. Unskilled workers, therefore, using their organizational power, will attempt to lobby the government to develop institutional monitoring mechanisms by which unskilled workers receive up-to-date job training and income transfers.
---------------------- Table 1 about here ------------------------- hypothesize that the latter structures will create higher levels of social trust and cooperation than the former ones.
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To abbreviate, the structure of training-based welfare states provide different groups of labor market actors with incentives to take part in skill formation and upgrading, thereby providing workers with future employment opportunities (along with an optimistic prospect of one"s life trajectory and risk management) 7 and employers with better qualified workers. While traditional transfer-based social transfers merely protect workers from the risk of job and income losses by supplementing income, ALMP plays a role of "skill and employment insurance." This institutional element will encourage all labor market actors to develop higher level of social trust.
In these countries, the degree of the recognition of mutual interests among social actors is high, as both employers and employees tolerate high taxation in exchange for high investment in enhancing "labor force qualification" (Huber and Stephens 2001) . After all, these supply-side social and labor market policies (Garret 1998; Boix 1998) uniquely focusing on the active measures that encourage workers to re-enter the labor markets with updated skills will be associated with not only employers" and employees" higher trust, but also closer trust among 6 Some social psychology literature argues that sanctioning and monitoring build greater assurance, which leads to higher trust among members (Yamagishi 1988a (Yamagishi , 1988b Yamagishi et al. 1998) , while others contend that monitoring and sanctioning undermine trust (Fehr and Rockenback 2003; Mulder et al. 2006 ). My point is that training-supplemented regime has "rewarding incentives" through skill training as well as "monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms." Therefore, I expect that, in training-supplemented welfare states, the effects of incentive mechanisms of ALMP may either lead sanctioning to play a positive role in building trust or at least outweigh the (arguably negative) effects of sanctioning on trust among labor market actors. different social classes (or occupational groups). These discussions lead to the following hypotheses. 
DATA AND MEASURES

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of this study is social trust at the individual level. or (2) one can"t be too careful (has to be very careful). One potential measurement issue is that this questionnaire in WVS might not capture "trust", but merely measure "skepticism", "cynicism", or more broadly "trustworthiness." (Cook et al. 2005 ). However, general others" trustworthiness will be highly correlated with an individual"s trust of general others, because other normal citizens" "trustworthiness" provides an individual with positive information for trusting decisions.
Independent Variables: Individual-level Predictors
At the individual level, I introduce respondents" household income, gender, age, religion, Seven occupation/industry variables are also introduced to test the first hypothesis that predicts the effects of skill-based occupational positions on social trust: they are professionals, white-collar office workers, skilled manual workers, unskilled manual workers, armed forces, and agricultural workers. "Managers" is omitted as the reference category. Sex and age are included as baseline controls. Part-time employed, unemployed, labor market outsiders, and selfemployed are included as dichotomous variables with full-time employed as the reference category. Respondents" income is included in the last model to avoid the significant sample reduction.
Independent Variables: Country-level Predictors
The training-supplemented welfare regime efforts will be measured by ALMP spending, which reflects the degree to which a society is concerned about increasing citizens" employment potentials by upgrading their skill levels, so that it becomes easier for them to re-enter the labor market after unemployment or a relatively long-term recess from previous employment. They are measured as total expenditures on active labor market policies as a percentage of GDP (OECD"s SOCX database, various years). 9 The transfer-based welfare regime efforts are initially measured by government social security transfers (as a percentage of GDP), which are composed of four major categories: cash benefits for sickness, old-age and survivors, family allowances, and social assistance grants and welfare (OECD"s Historical Statistics, various years).
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Income inequality is introduced as one of the context-level controls. Researchers focusing on market-based stratification have highlighted unequal distribution of income as a critical factor that generates wide variations in social trust across different societies (Uslaner 2002; Rothstein 9 One might contend that social trust might have a reverse causal effect on ALMP. Given that neo-corporatist institutions were built upon a high level of trust among labor, business and the state, ALMP might have been implemented based on a high level of trust, too. I propose two reasons why an endogeneity issue is not a serious concern for ALMP-trust linkage. First, historically, ALMP was devised by social democrat technocrats, and evolved into a main policy tool to combat unemployment since the 1960s in Nordic countries (OECD 1993) . In other words, they had been created and implemented by the social democratic policy makers before the Nordic countries started boosting their social trust during the 1980s and 1990s. At least until the early 1980s, trust levels in social democratic countries were not significantly higher than liberal countries or conservative countries. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that pre-existing high trust allowed the social democrat policy-makers to implement ALMP before the 1980s. Second, technically, an IV(instrumental variable) approach in the context of 2SLS(two stage least square) using panel data aggregated at country level (N=52) suggests that the instrument (cumulative left party incumbency) has expected positive and significant effects on trust (see appendix B4). Hausman endogeneity test reports that there is no systematic difference between the original analysis based on OLS-FEM and 2SLS-FEM (with 16 dummy variables).
10 I also created and tested a modified measure which subtracts old age pension component from the original social security transfers. The results were largely identical. International labor mobility is expected to increase the heterogeneity of civil society.
Extreme heterogeneity among immigrants" ethnic, racial and religious origins and compositions tend to cross-cut and weaken both political partisanship and community-level social groupings.
This will lead key voluntary associational activities to develop along racial/ethnic lines, thereby weakening solidarity and cooperation among citizens. International labor mobility, therefore, is expected to affect generalized trust negatively. International migration is measured as net migration rate, which is indirectly calculated from the data on population, population increase rate, and crude birth and death rates ( binary outcomes employs multiple equations for two levels, in which level-two equation has its own error term (u 0j ).
Log[p ij / (1− p ij ) = β 0j + β 1j (Individual Characteristic) ij ------- (1) β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Country-level Predictor) j + u 0j -------(2)
In the country-level equation, I restrict the specification to only the random intercept term (u0j),
as noted in equations (2) and (3), not allowing the slope coefficient, β 1j , to vary across country units. in the UK (in 1981 (in and 1990 (in ) to 51% in Canada (1990 , 49% in the US (1990), and 47% in Australia (1981) . And then, all residual countries suffered dramatic declines throughout the 12 Employing a two-level model, however, is not the most ideal specification for the (potentially three-level) data structure of this study, as individuals are nested within multiple waves of each country (17 countries have unbalanced, 2 to 4 waves, comprising 42 units at country level, while each wave has approximately 1,000 to 2,000 individual-level respondents). However, I decided not to use a three-level model in this study, because 2 to 4 waves for each country are too few to form a separate level. To deal with unspecified wave-level variations, I include three indicator variables for four waves at level-2 equation, with the first wave (1981) being the reference category (the results are presented in Table 3 ). In addition, I have also tested interaction terms between a year trend variable and all individual or country-level variables. As these interaction terms did not change the effects of the main independent variables significantly, I do not include them in the models reported in the text.
RESULTS
Descriptive Results
1990s. The degree of decline is astonishingly deep: the U.K. lost 35% of trusters in 10 years (from 42.4 to 27.7%); Canada and the U.S. have gone through the similar pattern in the 1990s to that of the U.K.
However, in Nordic universal countries (Panel 1-2), social trust has dramatically increased for two decades, with the exception of Sweden in the early 1990s which suffered a substantial slowdown of its economy. In Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Netherlands overall levels of social trust remain around 50% in the early 1980s, which is not different from those of residual countries, but in the late 1990s, except for Finland, all other three universal countries enjoyed about 65% of populations who said they generally trust others. The Netherlands, the most remarkable case even among universal countries, has boosted its trust level from 39% in 1981 to 59% in 1999.
In contrast to impressive over-time increases in trust in universal countries and striking decreases in residual countries, social insurance countries (Panel 1-3) have experienced neither significant gain nor significant decline, with the exception of Germany. Trust levels in most continental European countries such as France, Belgium, Austria and Italy, stay low throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Only Germany has boosted its trust level from 27% to 39% up through the mid 1990s after the unification, with a subsequent slight decline (36% in 1999). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of social trust, ALMP, and passive social transfers for three types of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1999) . Regarding between-unit variations, universal countries" ALMP spending is higher than those of the other two worlds, and also has grown faster: ALMP in universal countries in the 1990s is almost twice as big as that of
Continental social insurance countries, and four times bigger than that of liberal residual countries. Passive social transfer spending in universal countries is also non-comparably high.
Continental social insurance countries show fairly high levels of passive social transfers, and liberal countries spend least among three welfare regime types.
Over-time trajectories of social trust, ALMP, and passive social transfers in three worlds of welfare capitalisms can be summarized as follows: (1) Multivariate Results
Model 1 in Table 3 shows results from the baseline multi-level model predicting the effects of level-1 (individual level) covariates on social trust. Household income has strong posihtive effects on social trust. 13 Men are less likely to trust others than women. Age has a 13 Introducing household income variable causes a significant sample reduction due to missing data (8,085 = 49,041 -40,956) . To check if this sample reduction causes any bias in the main results, I present the regression results without this income variable in Appendix B2. There is little significant difference between the two results.
negative effect on social trust. Part-time employed show higher trust than full-time employed, but labor market outsiders such as housewives, students, and disabled have lower trust than full time insiders. Unemployed also show much lower trust than full-time employed and its coefficient is highly significant. Protestants are more likely to trust others than Catholics.
Married people have a higher level of trust than unmarried.
Importantly, large occupation/industry categories are highly significant. Professionals with the highest skill levels and job security show higher social trust compared to managers.
Skilled manual workers and agricultural workers show significantly lower trust than mangers.
Unskilled manual workers show the biggest difference in trust from employers and the negative logit coefficient (-0.386) is highly significant (t= 8.49). This implies that, for being unskilled workers, the odds of being trusters (exp -0.386 ) will be decreased by a factor of 0.68, or decreased 32%, with all other variables being held constant. The results support the key argument of this study that the power relationship between employers and employees is determined by the quantity of skill assets possessed by employees (Wright 1997) , and unskilled workers, due to their vulnerable position to potential abuse, manipulation, and exploitation by employer, are less likely to trust others.
14 Model 1 also tests the first hypothesis that passive social transfers will be negatively associated with social trust. Two variables, income inequality and international migration, are introduced as the baseline controls (at country level). Both variables are correctly signed, and statistically significant. The negative and significant coefficient of passive social transfer 14 Unskilled workers will be vulnerable to employers" exploitation, because both parties are aware that unskilled workers are easily replaceable depending upon employers" needs and would have hard time finding new jobs when laid off. Therefore, unskilled workers, due to their weak bargaining positions in labor markets, will accept unfair treatment in their working conditions and wage levels, and employers will make the most of unskilled workers" weak positions. As a result, unskilled workers are less likely to develop trusting relationships with their employers and others in general.
variable suggests that social spending may affect social trust in a negative way. The results give credence to my theoretical conjecture that both contributors" lingering concerns about free-riding and recipients" humiliation from means-tests and negative portrayal by media could be harmful to social trust. However, the small coefficient also suggests that it would be difficult to assert that greater passive social transfers are critically detrimental to social trust. The relationship might contain a contrasting trend that needs to be teased out by a separate mechanism.
In model 2, I introduce ALMP spending with the two same baseline control variables.
The effect of ALMP is prominent. The result supports the second hypothesis, which predicts that country-level spending on skill training system will be positively associated with individual-level trust. Both the size of coefficient and its level of statistical significance are substantially large.
The result implies that a society"s efforts to invest on enhancing unemployed and labor market outsiders" re-employment potentials plays a critical role in enhancing citizens" trust.
Model 3 in Table 3 explores whose trust level is boosted with increasing public investment on skills by analyzing the cross-level interaction effects between occupation/industry indicator variables and ALMP. The significant interaction terms between unskilled and ALMP and between agricultural workers and ALMP support the third hypothesis of this study, which predicts that, in countries with strong ALMP programs, differences in social trust between employers and low-skilled workers will be significantly diminished. In addition, not only unskilled, but also professionals and white-collar office workers show increasingly higher levels of trust in countries with higher ALMP spending.
These results are confirmed in Figure 2 , which illustrates the predictive probabilities for social trust by different occupational/industry categories. At the lowest level of ALMP, only professionals have higher probabilities of being trusters than employers, while manual unskilled, skilled, and agricultural workers have significantly lower chance of being trusters than employers. However, as ALMP increases, employers" probability of being trusters moderately increases, while professional, white-collar, agricultural, and unskilled manual workers" probabilities of being trusters sharply increase, if to different degrees. As a result, at the highest level of ALMP, professional, white-collar, and agricultural workers" chances of being trusters are significantly higher than employers", while unskilled workers" has almost caught up with employers". Especially, at the highest level of ALMP, the differences in predicted probabilities among all occupational categories are smaller than those at the lowest level of ALMP. These findings support the central argument of this study (hypothesis 3), that ALMP encourages different labor market and class actors, especially employees, to develop trust of others. Overall, higher ALMP spending not only increases individuals" overall chance of being trusters, but also decreases differences in the chance of being trusters between employers and employees.
Model 4 test the fourth hypothesis that the negative effects of passive social transfers on social trust will be conditional upon the role of ALMP. As expected, the interaction term is positive and highly significant. The finding supports my claim that ALMP prevents high passive social transfers from invoking hostility and suspicion among labor market actors, and further enables contributing citizens to be less concerned about free-riders" abuse of the social safety net, while beneficiary citizens maintain their dignity from current adversities. This result also convincingly accounts for the difference in trust level between Nordic social democratic countries and the rest of the welfare states. The coexistence of high level of passive social transfers and high social trust in the universal model of welfare states may be attributable to the effective combination of income supplement and skill training/job assistance programs. In contrast to the Nordic model, traditionally high levels of generous transfers in continental Europe and increasing passive transfers in liberal countries without the ALMP components may account for their persistent low trust (continental Europe) or declining trust (liberal countries).
In model 5, I introduce all variables used in the previous models with additional control variables, GDP per capital (log), unemployment rate, and net union density. The effect of GDP per capita on trust is positive and statistically significant, as expected. The unexpected positive effect of unemployment rate on trust may be attributable to the recent economic downturn in social democratic countries, in which universal welfare systems have helped citizens maintain the high levels of social trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . In this full model, the interaction terms between ALMP and industry/occupation indicator variables are robust, and the interaction term between ALMP and passive social transfer is still highly significant at α = 0.01 level.
Overall, these findings support my claim that active skill training regime enables employees in more vulnerable positions in the labor market to gain optimistic views of their life chances and thus eventually to build higher levels of social trust.
CONCLUSION
This article attempted to advance our understanding of the source of trust in two aspects:
first, by building a unified theoretical framework that incorporates several different sources of literature; and second, by providing strong empirical evidence based on cross-national multi-15 I also conducted diagnostic tests to detect influential outliers in model 6. As this study primarily investigates the effects of ALMP on trust, I employ DFBETAS, which detects a single case"s influence on a specific independent variable (ALMP). Based on regression results from the fixed effects models (model 3 in appendix B4-2) using aggregated panel data at country level (N=52), we found three influential observations, Denmark 1981, Netherland 1981, and Sweden 1981 (Dfbeta > 0.277). Then, following Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis, and Pelzer"s recommendation (2006), we introduced an indicator (dummy) variable to control for the (potentially influential) effects of these three observations on the estimate of the key variable, ALMP, and other covariates. The result was reported in model 6, which shows that controlling for the influence of these three observations (at level 2) does not alter any substantial findings. universal welfare institutions as a common resource pool for risk management. As ALMP weakens incentives for free-riding that is inherent in generous welfare states, while providing labor market outsiders with incentives for re-entering the labor market, it should be treated as an essential element that allows "universal welfare state institutions" to generate a high level of social trust on a long-term basis. Overall, the combination of appropriate skill-training and generous social transfers may provide institutional bases for cooperation and trust among citizens when they have to maintain their skills and income under increasingly hostile and unstable economic environments.
The successful social democratic model of skill-supply regime (or human capital formation regime, Garrett 1998; Boix 1998) and its policy structure also has a strong practical implication for other countries trying to apply ALMP to their labor markets. The recently celebrated Dutch case provides appropriate strategies to achieve both social solidarity and efficiency, neither intensifying nor reinforcing existing social divisions. The Netherlands have achieved a level of generalized trust corresponding to those of Social Democratic countries for the last two decades, despite the Netherlands" heterogeneous religious composition and increasing ethnic diversity. They cut passive social transfers almost by a half for those two decades (from 25.5% to 13.9% of GDP), while increasing spending on other active labor market measures that help labor market outsiders get back to work. In conjunction with ALMP, the Netherlands have dramatically boosted their total employment (Kenworthy 2008). Therefore, the Dutch case suggests that it is not impossible to meet the increasing needs of the disadvantaged in the labor market, the unemployed, and the unskilled for better economic opportunities, while also not discouraging the advantaged (employers and skilled workers) from seeking their own interests.
In the United States, both federal and local state governments have attempted to import some components of ALMP through existing social welfare programs and by creating new job training programs, but their efforts were limited and their performances were unsuccessful.
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) has reinforced only "monitoring devices" by imposing stricter eligibility and limitation of duration, while failing to providing poor singlemothers with job training opportunities.
It is true that European welfare states with corporatist traditions have quite different political and institutional histories such as strong labor unions, strong left-wing party, and coordinated wage bargaining institutions, all of which have been absent in the United States.
Therefore, it may be unrealistic to expect that the United States will eventually embrace this universal component of skill training programs as a part of their welfare system.
However, the United States indeed have some job training programs such as WIA (the Workforce Investment Act), although it is limited to a certain segment of population -the unemployed urban youth --in its scale and scope and has failed to provide meaningful skill upgrades to them. The lack of employers" involvement in the contents and the levels of public skill investment have led to their apathy towards existing job training programs, and to further ineffective performances of those programs in labor market.
Finally, this study suggests that employers" interest in public training program is critical in making all labor market actors participate in and benefit from the programs in the long term.
The study also suggests that employers themselves may actively develop their demands and interests around public provision of skills and income supplements. The success of job training programs hinges on whether the program designers can contrive to develop incentive mechanisms that allow employers to be engaged in the functioning and development of specific training contents and manuals. In addition, the success of ALMP-type programs will also rely on their capacity to embrace diverse ethnic groups and broad class categories. If they are disproportionally targeted on a specific minority ethnic/racial group and the bottom of the social stratum, it might be stigmatized, and in a worse case, might contribute to decline in social trust.
To abbreviate, the overall findings of this study suggest that engineering social trust is a matter of configuring the institutional means by which citizens in different labor market positions and occupational/industrial categories are guaranteed to participate in market opportunities, and by which they have long-term prospects to manage their life chances. (1981 & 1990) 1990s (1995 & 2000) 1980s (1981 & 1990) 1990s (1995 & 2000) 1980s (1981 & 1990) 1990s (1995 & 2000) Universal Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Total Observations = 52 (number of countries = 17) 
